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Docket No. E-00000A-02-0051 PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING ELECTRIC) RESTRUCTURING ISSUES IN THE MATTER OF ARIZONA PUBLIC) Docket No. E-01345A-01-0822 SERVICE COMPANY'S REQUEST FOR A) VARIANCE OF CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS OF) A.A.C. R14-22-1606 IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERIC) Docket No. E-00000A-01-0630 PROCEEDING CONCERNING THE ARIZONA) INDEPENDENT SCHEDULING) **ADMINISTRATOR** IN THE MATTER OF TUCSON ELECTRIC) Docket No. E-01933A-02-0069 POWER COMPANY'S APPLICATION FOR A) VARIANCE OF CERTAIN ELECTRIC) COMPETITION RULES COMPLIANCE DATES) Docket No. E-01933A-98-0471 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF) TUCSON ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY FOR) APPROVAL OF ITS STRANDED COST) RECOVERY

> JOINT BRIEF OF SEMPRA ENERGY RESOURCES **AND** SOUTHWESTERN POWER GROUP, II, L.L.C. **ON CERTAIN** TRACK "A" ISSUES

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I.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the guidance and instructions provided by the Commission's Chief Administrative Law Judge ("CALJ") during the public hearings on June 28, 2002 (Tr. 1462, 1. 1 - Tr. 1463, 1. 8), Sempra Energy Resources ("Sempra") and Southwestern Power Group, II, L.L.C. ("SWPG") hereby submit their Joint Brief on certain Track "A" Issues. As used herein, the phrase "Track 'A' Issues" means those issues identified as such at page 1, line 27 - page 2, line 1 of the Procedural Order issued by the ACLJ on May 2, 2002 in the above - captioned consolidated proceedings. [also, see Tr. 1462, 1. 19 - Tr. 1463, 1. 7] Those issues relate to the subjects of (i) transfer of assets and associated market power, (ii) Code(s) of Conduct, (iii) Affiliated Interest Rules and (iv) FERC-ACC jurisdiction. Sempra and SWPG discuss issue areas (i) through (iii) below.

Although Track "A" and Track "B" ("competitive solicitation") issues are in reality substantially intertwined in many respects, Sempra and SWPG will endeavor to confine the following discussion to Track "A" issues as much as possible. The May 2, 2002 Procedural Order establishes a separate timeline and process for the consideration and resolution of Track "B" issues; and Sempra and SWPG, either jointly or independently, will submit comments upon (and perhaps brief) those issues as that process goes forward.

TRANSFER OF GENERATION ASSETS

AND

ASSOCIATED MARKET POWER

A. Rule 1606 (B) and Rule 1615 History Is Relevant To Timing of Asset Transfer.

Rule 1606 (B) and Rule 1615 of the Commission's Electric Competition Rules ("ECR") did not evolve independent of one another. To the contrary, they share a common genesis in the Commission's rulemaking proceedings during the late 1990's when it undertook to create a framework for restructuring the electric utility industry within the State of Arizona in order to facilitate the introduction of competition.

Market power concerns were a major consideration during the course of those earlier proceedings, just as they have been in the Track "A" portion of these consolidated proceedings. In fact, during the previous proceedings, several prospective Electric Service Provider ("ESP") applicants contended that market power problems could be avoided only by requiring that incumbent Affected Utilities divest their generation assets to unaffiliated third parties. ² In turn, the incumbent Affected Utilities argued they should have the right of transfer to an affiliate.

The current content of and functional interrelationship between Rule 1606(B) and Rule 1615 represent the Commission's endeavor to achieve a balance among these concerns and divergent

¹ Such as Arizona Public Service Company ("APS") and Tucson Electric Power Company ("TEP").

² Related issues included the best procedure for implementing a divestiture requirement (e.g. auction), and who should receive the economic benefit when generation assets sold in excess of undepreciated book value.

viewpoints. Rule 1615 requires Affected Utilities to dispose of their generation assets prior to January 1, 2003.³ However, they would have the option of either transferring them to an affiliate or divesting them to an unaffiliated third party. In addition, Rule 1606(B) requires that Utility Distribution Companies ("UDC") satisfy their requirements for power through competitive procurement after January 1, 2003, with at least 50% of such power to be procured through competitive bid. Through this approach, it was envisioned that the goal of electric competition could be advanced and market power concerns addressed.

The central features of the Commission's strategy were (i) the generation asset transfer

The central features of the Commission's strategy were (i) the generation asset transfer requirement and (ii) the 100% competitive procurement requirement. These requirements were intrinsically interwoven, and the success of the competitive endeavor necessitated the presence of each in close proximity to the other. In the context of Rule 1615 and Rule 1606(B), that spatial relationship was reflected as a 24-hour "lag," which was driven by the Commission's desire to establish a specific date by which competition would start. Left to their own discretion, the Affected Utilities and UDC's otherwise could have delayed the onset of competition.

There is nothing in the record of the above-captioned consolidated proceedings to suggest that the functional interrelationship or "linkage" between the transfer of generation assets and commencement of competitive procurement envisioned and provided for by Rule 1615 and Rule 1606(B) is no longer sound. To the contrary, the overwhelming weight of the evidence suggests that the maintenance of such "linkage" is essential to the achievement of both a level field for

³The actual text of Rule 1615 and Rule 1606 (B) contains the date of January 1, 200<u>1</u>. However, by Commission decision, that date has been extended to January 1, 200<u>3</u>. For purposes of this Joint Brief, the extended date of January 1, 2003 will be used in discussing both Rule 1615 and Rule 1606(B).

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competition and the avoidance of market power problems. Furthermore, it is because of this functional interrelationship that the Commission cannot meaningfully resolve Track "A" issues until it is prepared to contemporaneously resolve Track "B" issues.

Generation Asset Transfer and Competitive Procurement Process Implementation В. Should Occur "Simultaneously"

For the reasons discussed above, and because of market power concerns raised anew in the recently concluded Track "A" hearings, Sempra and SWPG firmly believe that the Commission should establish as a fundamental principle that generation asset transfers will not be allowed to occur under Rule 1615 until the competitive procurement process contemplated by and provided for under Rule 1606(B) has been implemented. As used in this context, "implemented" means (i) contracts for the provision of electric power have been awarded by UDC's pursuant to a Commission-approved competitive procurement process, (ii) the results of that process have been publicly announced and (iii) the resulting power procurement contracts have been reviewed and approved by the Commission. Furthermore, Sempra and SWPG believe that the deadlines for generation asset transfer and competitive power procurement currently set forth in Rule 1615 and Rule 1606(B) should not be altered as yet. It would be premature to conclude at this juncture that a viable competitive procurement process cannot be put in place by January 1, 2003; and the evidentiary record in the Track "A" proceedings indicates both APS and TEP could complete the transfer of generation assets they own to generation affiliates prior to January 1, 2003. [As to APS, see Tr. 160, l.18- Tr. 161, l.15; as to TEP, see Tr. 639, l.3-21] Moreover, it would also be premature to conclude at this time that the additional market power studies recommended by the Commission's Staff could not be completed, evaluated and used constructively before the end of this calendar year.

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In the event developments during the next few months suggest that the scheme contemplated by Rule 1615 and Rule 1606(B) cannot properly be implemented by the current deadlines, the Commission can utilize the variance process provided for at Rule 1614(C) and/or an A.R.S. §40-252 approach, depending upon the specific circumstances it desires to address. In so doing, it can avoid reopening or supplanting the rulemaking process and decisions underlying Rule 1615 and Rule 1606 (B), which are still fundamentally sound concepts. Moreover, it can fashion an interim or transition mechanism which is tailored to deal with a specific set of circumstances; or, perhaps, a particular UDC's system. Yet, even in such "particularized" actions the Commission should still adhere to the aforementioned precepts that generation asset transfer and competitive power procurement should occur simultaneously as to a given UDC system.

By proceeding in the manner discussed above, the Commission can maintain and nurture the momentum towards a competitive wholesale electric market. Not a single witness testified in the Track "A" hearings that such competition was no longer a desirable goal. To the contrary, several acknowledged the benefits to be realized from competition. [See, e.g., Davis (APS) at Tr. 213, 1.7-23; Cichetti (APS) at Tr. 309, 1.19-22; and Higgins (AECC) at Tr. 1202, 1.2- Tr. 1204, 1.10; and Tr. 1184, l.18-Tr. 1185, l.21]. Morever, there was testimony that the current and near term future competitive wholesale power market for Arizona consumers is quite favorable. [See Roach (Panda/TECO) at Tr. 743, 1.5- Tr. 744, 1.2] In addition, the Commission can draw upon its experience with the Track "B" process during the next few months incident to a determination as to whether any changes in the ECRs are in fact necessary, rather than acting upon conjecture and speculation which currently exist.

C. Phased Generation Asset Transfer May Be Appropriate In Certain Circumstances.

As previously noted, concern has been expressed in the Track"A" proceedings with regard to market power which APS and TEP currently possess in certain areas on their respective systems. The Commission's Staff has recommended that additional market power studies be conducted and resulting proposed mitigation measures submitted for Commission review and decision. Sempra and SWPG believe that such actions would be appropriate. However, they do not believe that all generation asset transfer activities should be put on "hold" during the period of such review and decision, in the event that the necessary mitigation measures cannot be placed into effect by the end of this year.

Rather, they believe that the transfer of generation assets should proceed pursuant to Rule 1615, and in tandem with the implementation of competitive procurement pursuant to Rule 1606(B), to the extent and when market power problems do not exist. Where adequate transmission capacity is present, the competitive wholesale power market should be afforded the opportunity to serve the power and energy requirements of the customer load served by those transmission facilities. APS endorsed the concept that network transmission service rights should "follow" the load being served, and Sempra and SWPG support that view. [See Deise (APS) at Tr. 1106, l.13 - Tr. 1110, l.14; and Tr. 1092, l.3-6] TEP did not oppose this concept during the hearings, and there is no reason that it should.

By adopting this approach, the Commission can maintain and nurture the momentum towards wholesale competition that has been achieved during the past four-plus years. That momentum exists, among other forms, in the ECRs which have been adopted to date and the competitive merchant power plants which have been approved for siting and construction by the Arizona Power

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Plant and Transmission Line Siting Committee and the Commission. A number of these plants are either now in service or substantially under construction, and several will be in a position to provide power on a competitive basis to a significant portion of APS' and TEP's Standard Offer customer load during 2003 and thereafter.⁴ In addition, more competitive generating capacity will be coming on line in 2004 and subsequent years.

The transmission capacity available for use in this manner has been identified in part through the testimony of APS witness Deise [Tr.1114, 1.17-24], and Commission Staff witness Schlissel [Ex. 5-9, page 6, Table DAS - R1; Ex. 5-8, page 6, 1.7-13; and Tr. 1408, 1.13-Tr.1409, 1.5] The remaining transmission capacity available for such use in competitively serving Standard Offer customer load on APS' system, and that available to serve TEP's customers, can (and necessarily should) be identified in connection with development and implementation of the competitive power procurement process to be established pursuant to Track "B" of these consolidated proceedings.

The momentary existence of market power conditions, and the temporary absence of approved mitigation measures, need not be a barrier to the Commission moving forward towards at least partial realization of the competitive goal in the manner and on the schedule contemplated by Rule 1615 and Rule 1606(B). Through the intelligent use of partial variances, if and as necessary, and a well-conceived competitive procurement process, the Commission can substantially advance and realize the goal of a competitive wholesale electric market by this time next year. None of the witnesses in the Track "A" proceedings recommended that that goal should be abandoned and it should not. Rather, the Commission should continue to steadily move forward on as many fronts

⁴ These plants include Pinnacle West Energy Corporation's combined-cycle generating facilities at the West Phoenix and Redhawk power plant locations, which clearly were sited and constructed with the intent of serving the competitive wholesale power market.

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as possible, creating only such areas of temporary variations or exception as may be necessary until it is satisfied appropriate protective measures are in place for affected Standard Offer customers.

D. Identification of Generation Assets To Be Transferred

Sempra and SWPG recommend that the Commission include as a part of its decision on Track "A" issues an ordering paragraph requiring APS and TEP to (i) specifically identify those generation assets, if any, which they do not intend to transfer pursuant to Rule 1615 prior to January 1, 2003, and (ii) provide a detailed written explanation why such transfer is believed to be unnecessary or inappropriate under the rule. Further, such ordering paragraph should specify a date by which such prefilings should be made by APS and TEP, in order to allow the Commission sufficient time to review such detailed explanations, if any, and conduct such hearings as it may desire in connection with the same.

Through the imposition of such a requirement, the Commission will be in a position to make an informed determination as to whether both APS and TEP are proceeding to dispose of "all competitive generation assets," as is contemplated and required by Rule 1615. In addition, to the extent either APS or TEP, or both, are not, the Commission will also be in a position to ascertain whether (i) some form of temporary variance or exemption pursuant to Rule 1614(C) might be appropriate for consideration, or (ii) APS and/or TEP should be directed to transfer those generation assets as well.5

⁵ The status and treatment of "reliable must run" ("RMR") generation units will be very important, both from a market power perspective and in relation to the competitive power procurement process contemplated by Rule 1606(B). Sempra and SWPG will address this further during the Track "B" phase of these consolidated proceedings.

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III.

CODE OF CONDUCT

Rule 1616 of the ECRs requires that each Affected Utility, such as APS and TEP.

"... which plans to offer noncompetitive services and which plans to offer competitive services through its competitive electric affiliate shall propose a Code of Conduct to prevent anti-competitive activities . . . "

As Commission Staff witness Keene testified,

"Codes of Conduct are safeguards governing the behavior and structure of utility relationships with affiliates. The purposes of Codes of Conduct include: creating barriers to self-dealing, preventing preferential treatment to affiliates, ensuring that utility ratepayers do not subsidize unregulated utility affiliates, and mitigating market power." [Ex. S-11, page 3, lines 7-10]

However, Ms. Keene also noted that

"... The Code of Conduct [requirement] only applies to the relationship between the Affected Utility and its ESP [Electric Services Provider] affiliate." [Ex. S-11, page 4, lines 12-13]

It does not apply to any relationships between the Affected Utility and any other affiliates. Moreover, while the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") has promulgated regulations governing transmission access and business transactions between affiliates at market-based rates.

> "The FERC standards of conduct for transmission providers do not address types of market power abuse, such as cross-subsidization and transfers of information. [Moreover] The FERC Code of Conduct for a utility to transact business with affiliates at market-based rates places restrictions on non-power sales but does not address power sales." [Ex. S-11, page 5, lines 19-23]

UCSON, ARIZONA 85711 (520) 721-1900 In that regard, Ms. Keene also noted that

"The [Commission's] Public Utility Holding Companies and Affiliated Interest rules do not address wholesale power transactions between affiliated entities." [Ex. S-11, page 5, lines 15-16]

Against this background, the Commission's Staff is recommending the adoption of several requirements to address and resolve potential problems which otherwise might be associated with affiliate relationships in Arizona. Those recommendations relate to both generation asset transfers and purchased power transactions between affiliates (of an Affected Utility and a UDC), and they are itemized in Ms. Keene's prefiled direct testimony. [Ex. S-11, page 7, lines 9-25] In addition, the Commission's Staff is recommending the Commission adopt a requirement for Code(s) of Conduct applicable to

"... an investor-owed electric utility regulated by the Commission and all affiliates from which the utility may purchase power or which are in energy-related fields." [Ex. S-11, page 8, lines 1-4]

The details of those recommendations are also set for in Ms. Keene's prefiled direct and corrected testimony. [Ex. S-11, page 8, lines 6-17 and Ex. S-12]

Sempra and SWPG support the foregoing recommendations of the Commission's Staff. In addition, they suggest that the Commission convene public hearings and/or an oral and written comment procedure in connection with its consideration of various Code(s) of Conduct filed in response to the requirements recommended by the Commission Staff. Finally, Sempra and SWPG urge the Commission to adopt the aforesaid recommendations, and initiate suggested review procedures in such a manner as to allow the new Code(s) of Conduct to be effective and available for use in connection with the operative dates under Rule 1615 and Rule 1606(B) [January 1, 2003], respectively.

AFFILIATED INTEREST RULES

The discussion set forth under Section III above is incorporated herein by reference to the extent applicable to the issue area of Affiliated Interest Rules. Inasmuch as Ms. Keene was the only witness to discuss Code(s) of Conduct and Affiliated Interest Rules to any extent, it seemed appropriate and more orderly to deal with both aspects of her testimony and the Commission's Staff's related recommendations at the same time.

V.

CONCLUSION

Sempra and SWPG believe that the preceding discussion addresses those Track "A" issues identified in the CALJ's May 2, 2002 Procedural Order. They further believe that their recommendations as to how the Commission should proceed will enable it to continue the transition toward wholesale electric competition under Rule 1615 and Rule 1606(B) in an uninterrupted manner from this point forward, consistent with undertaking such protective or mitigation measures as may be necessary to address the interests and needs of Standard Offer customers.

Dated: July 9, 2002

Respectfully submitted,

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